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ABSTRACT.   
Thermodynamic random processes in thermal systems are generally associated with one or several 
relaxation times, the inverse of which are formally homogeneous with energy.  Here, we show in a 
precise way that the periodic modification of relaxation times during temperature-constant 
thermodynamic cycles can be thermodynamically beneficiary to the operator. This result holds as 
long as the operator who adjusts relaxation times does not attempt to control the randomness 
associated with relaxation times itself as a Maxwell ‘demon’ would do. Indirectly, our result also 
shows that thermal randomness appears satisfactorily described within a conventional 
quantum-statistical framework, and that the attempts advocated notably by Ilya Prigogine to go 
beyond a Hilbert space description of quantum statistics do not seem justified – at least according to 
the present state of our knowledge. Fundamental interpretation of randomness, either thermal or 
quantum mechanical, is briefly discussed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Since the pioneering works of Carnot and Clausius, thermal fluctuations have been 
described in rather negative terms, since, from a practical point of view, heat has been considered 
as a degenerate form of energy. One the positive side, however, thermodynamic fluctuations may 
also be considered as a unique tool allowing for the use of conventional thermal machines. To 
consider a very simple example, let us imagine a system under thermodynamic equilibrium 
possessing an eigenstate of lowest energy E1 and corresponding occupation p1. No Hamiltonian 
entirely controlled by the observer can compel the final occupation p'1 of the lowest energy state to 
verify: 
 
     pp 11' ≻     (1). 
 
What 'pure' work alone cannot perform, fluctuations can achieve easily, however, through 
thermalisation at a lower temperature than T. When adjusted through time to interact with other 
thermal fluctuations, fluctuations may even be considered to be beneficial from the point of view of 
an external operator, as we now illustrate in two successive examples. 
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We first imagine a hollow ball filled with some diamagnetic liquid into which colloidal particles are 
kept in suspension. The colloidal particles are supposed to be paramagnetic, each particle 
possessing a single axis of highest paramagnetic susceptibility. We assume that when submitted to 
a magnetic field, the diamagnetic response of the liquid may be considered as nearly instantaneous, 
whereas the paramagnetic response of the colloidal particles is much slower, being conditioned by 
the Brownian motion of the liquid. We further suppose that for a given temperature T, when the ball 
remains at rest, the total static magnetic susceptibility of the ball is exactly zero. The ball is inserted 
at position x in a horizontal magnetic field B(x) oriented along xx'. The field B(x) possesses a 
magnetic gradient also oriented along xx'. Since the magnetic susceptibility of the ball is zero, the 
ball is not externally affected by the magnetic field. We now deposit the ball at the surface of a liquid 
where it can float and drift freely. The external magnetic field B(x) remains unaffected. The 
Brownian motion of the liquid outside the ball excites the rotational and translational degrees of 
freedom of the ball. Since the paramagnetic response of colloidal particles is slower than the 
diamagnetic response of the liquid inside the ball, the ball's rotation indirectly lowers its effective 
susceptibility. As a corollary result, in average, the ball drifts towards smaller fields values, i.e. from 
x towards x', and such movement can be converted into work at the benefit of the operator. If, after 
some work has been extracted from the system in that way, the operator lifts up the ball again and 
keeps it out of the liquid during a time long enough, all three rotational degrees of freedom of the 
ball being frozen, the effective magnetic susceptibility of the ball turns back to zero. From that 
moment, the operator can transfer the ball to higher x values at no energy cost. If, after this, the ball 
is again deposited on the liquid's surface, the ball starts to drift again towards smaller field values, 
etc. At first sight, it seems that some heat extracted from the liquid above which the ball is floating 
may be converted into work, while no external source of heat is used to heat or cool the whole 
system. Therefore, a careful examination of all energy transfers taking place during a cycle needs 
to be done. First of all, we may note that the external magnetic field needed for the experiment can 
be provided by a magnet that never moves, so that no work is directly transmitted from the magnet 
to the system or vice versa. What happens to the ball when it floats towards x', or when it is 
transported back towards x has already been described briefly. The most delicate steps correspond 
to the 'lifting' and the 'lowering' of the ball. Unfortunately, these steps are difficult to analyze 
accurately. 
In order to remedy to this conceptual weakness, we need to find an analogous but more tractable 
experimental set-up, for which every step can be analyzed quantitatively. We now therefore 
propose to consider a kind of magnetic compass floating above a non-magnetic liquid whose 
susceptibility, either static or dynamic, is simply zero. The field of the compass is supposed to be 
horizontally oriented. For simplicity, we imagine that the compass is cylindrical in shape, its main 
axis of symmetry being oriented along the vertical axis zz'. No permanent magnetic field is imposed 
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from outside on the system, and the earth's magnetic field is also supposed to be absent. The 
Brownian motion of the liquid induces the rotation of the horizontal magnetic field of the compass 
around the axis zz'. The typical time needed for the compass to make a half turn (randomly 
clockwise or anticlockwise) at temperature T can be noted as Tcomp(T). At time t0=0, a box 
containing a gas whose only magnetic susceptibility we consider is due to the nuclear spins of its 
gaseous atoms is placed above the compass at a certain distance d0. The reason we imagine that 
nuclear spins are the only source of magnetic susceptibility of the box is that at low fields, the 
relaxation time (usually noted T1 in NMR) of such spins is known to be extremely long, easily 
exceeding days. Such T1 can therefore be supposed to be so large that: 
 
    TT comp≻≻1     (2). 
 
Under such regime, the compass turns too fast for the nuclear spins to follow the orientation of its 
magnetization efficiently. In average, the box containing the nuclear spins is less attracted by the 
compass than if the compass was fully at rest. Suppose now that during a time lasting from t0 to t1 
(t1-t0<<Tcomp), the moment of inertia of the compass is considerably augmented, no other parameter 
of the system being externally affected. This can be achieved if the compass possesses a built-in 
programmable machinery enabling it to move a massive (for simplicity, non-magnetic) part of its 
own structure away from its central vertical axis (above the surface of the liquid). Ideally, we may 
suppose that the moment of inertia of the compass becomes so large that the new typical time 
needed for the compass to make a half turn, noted T’comp, verifies: T’comp>>T1>>Tcomp. Starting from 
time t1, the average thermal magnetization of the nuclear spins follows the random movement of 
the field of the compass quite efficiently. The box containing the nuclear spins becomes more 
attracted towards the compass. If, starting from a time t2 (with t2-t1>>T1), we allow the box to be 
externally moved down towards the compass, work can be extracted from the system during this 
time. The time when the box is finally stopped at some distance d1 from the magnet (d1<d0) can be 
noted t3. From t3 to t4 (t4-t3=t1-t0), the moment of inertia of the compass is reduced (using again the 
in-built machinery located inside the compass) by the same amount it was increased between t0 
and t1. Starting then from t5, with t5-t4>>T1, the box is pulled upwards by the operator and reaches 
back the original position it had at time t0. This demands some work from the operator, but less than 
the work extracted when the box was getting closer to the compass, since the box is less attracted 
by the compass from t4 to t5 than from t1 to t2. When the box, at a time t6, finds back the original 
position it had at t0, a new thermodynamic cycle can start again, etc. All the steps described in the 
cycle can be analysed in detail. This is true also for the two steps (t1-t0) and (t4-t3) during which the 
moment of inertia of the compass is modified. During these two steps, at first sight, the machinery 
built inside the compass hardly needs to spend any work. On closer analysis, random rotation of 
the compass must be considered: the higher the energy of rotation of the compass, the easier it is 
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to enhance its moment of inertia (thanks to centrifugal force). By chance, the rotational energy of 
the compass happens to be statistically slightly higher at time t0 (just before the moment of inertia is 
enhanced) than at t3 (just before the moment of inertia is reduced), since the attractive potential of 
the nuclear spins, acting as a kind of ‘brake’ on the Brownian motion of the compass, is more 
effective at t3 than at t0. What happens when the moment of inertia of the compass changes is 
physically strongly analogous to what happened when the ball of our first example was lifted up or 
down. The advantage of our second example is simply that the energy balance of the system can 
be straightforwardly evaluated during these kinds of steps. There, thermal fluctuations appear 
generous enough to provide some work both to the observer manipulating the box of nuclear spins 
and to the machinery built inside the compass. In such an example, for the sake of clarity, we 
imposed that T’comp>>T1>>Tcomp. However, the mere condition T’comp>Tcomp would suffice to 
authorize some energy conversion from heat to work, whatever the value of T1. Quite similarly, in 
our first example, the crucial condition allowing for the conversion of heat into work during the 
translations of the ball along xx' was that the rotation of the ball in the liquid should be faster than its 
rotation above the liquid. Let us recall that in the presentation of our first example, we initially 
supposed that the rotation of the ball above the liquid was completely frozen, which amounts to say 
that the typical time associated with the rotation of the ball was infinite. Eventually, thermal 
fluctuations acting, not directly on fixed potentials controlled by the observer but rather on other 
thermal fluctuations, render possible the conversion of heat into work. The only necessary 
condition appears to be that the 'relaxation' time associated with one source of fluctuations may be 
varied at will by the operator. As our last example shows unambiguously, the operator does not 
necessarily need to spend any work in order to adjust such a thermodynamic time. 
 
So far, no quantum statistics have been used in our analysis. But the question inevitably arises: 
since quantum statistics tell us that any eigenstate of energy E should be populated in proportion 
to: 
 
     eE kT
E
−
≈)(ρ     (3) 
 
when thermal equilibrium is attained, how can conversion of heat into work ever take place in that 
case? To find the correct explanation, we need to remember that thermal equilibrium, in fact, never 
corresponds to an exact thermalisation of ‘pure’ quantum states, but only to the statistical 
thermalisation of such states. Strictly speaking, thermalisation does not imply that any pure 
eigenstate of energy E is exactly populated according to eq.(3) at equilibrium, but that any wave 
function ‘close enough’ to a pure eigenstate of energy E should be populated in a proportion ‘close 
enough’ to the ideal ration provided by eq.(3) once equilibrium is reached. Even under thermal 
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equilibrium, thermal fluctuations continually take place, so that the energy of any quantum state can 
only be known up to a precision of: 
 
    
timerelaxationThermal
E ℏ=δ    (4). 
 
 
Here, what we note as a Thermal relaxation time is the result of relevant random processes. In the 
case of nuclear spins, for instance, the statistical energy of their quantum states can only be 
defined up to a precision inversely proportional to T1, where T1 is the relaxation time of the nuclear 
spins. In our experimental schemes, we never try to ‘order disorder’ in a way similar to that 
considered by Maxwell[1], since such attempt would inevitably be accompanied by extra energy 
costs abundantly described in the literature. Rather, we accept randomness as it is, and only play 
with the relaxation times lying at the heart of random processes. It must be emphasized that 
entropy remains an authentic marker of the quantity of statistical disorder of our systems at any 
time. Our schemes would prove useless for recovering any thermally lost information. Only ‘new’ 
order may be introduced in the system.  
 
Indirectly, our conclusions tend to indicate that, fundamentally, the flow of time which human beings 
perceive as irreversible is not ontologically connected with thermodynamic irreversibility. The 
attempts of Prigogine [2], who advocates the use of quantum wave functions outside of a Hilbert 
space in order to fix the arrow of time, seem difficult to reconcile with our results. Admittedly, the 
‘pure’ eigenstates of a whole system (all external thermal or energy sources being included) always 
play experimentally a kind of ghostly role, since thermalisation, strictly speaking, cannot apply to 
them. Therefore, their very existence may ontologically be doubted, especially since no branch of 
experimental physics appears separable from thermodynamics. However, the hypothesis of their 
existence, which invites one to attribute apparent thermal irreversibility to the ‘limited experimental 
capabilities’ (some textbooks would rather say the ‘limited knowledge’, which seems less to the 
point) of an operator probing a macroscopic system, appears in good agreement with all 
experiments known so far including in principle the two ones considered above in this study.  
The existence of ‘pure eigenstates of the universe’ and their significance for the interpretation of 
randomness nevertheless raises some conceptual difficulties which Prigogine has legitimately 
emphasised. Before concluding this article, we briefly evoke such difficulties. Our discussion 
successively comments epistemological, thermodynamic and quantum dynamical issues. All these 
issues are ultimately relevant in some way for thermodynamics. 
On the epistemological level, let us consider the idea that ‘pure eigenstates’, or even possibly only 
one of them, could describe the whole universe, including therefore all human activities. 
Fundamentally, the epistemological problem raised by such kind of idea possesses a much older 
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history than modern physics. Part of the problem was already raised by some Greek thinkers of the 
Antiquity, notably Parmenides and Heraclites, and reappeared later through the diverging 
ontological views of Plato and Aristotle. Also relevant to the problem is the point of view of the 
highly original third century B.C. Chinese thinker Gongsun Long [3] who says: ‘The designation (of 
a thing) is not part of the world, whereas (designed) things are part of the world’. Basically, the 
problem at stake here lies in the coherence between matter and human language (and for us today, 
not only language, but also physics). Whatever the precise answer Gongsun Long effectively 
provided (his argumentation is actually very hard to follow in detail, and has received several 
contradictory interpretations), the problem he evoked remains relevant until today. Naively, we 
might be tempted to think today that some kind of totality should, by definition, provide us with a 
natural means to connect matter and language in some way. However, Russell’s famous paradox 
[4] indicates that no Set of all sets can exist, since the Set of all sets not containing themselves 
would contain itself if and only if it didn’t contain itself. Following the same line of reasoning, we 
might show that no Theory encompassing all theories can exist, and even that no Thought of all 
thoughts can exist. In this last example, Russell’s paradox reaches a kind of climax since, as far as 
language is concerned, the Thought of all thoughts can always be considered as a thought. The 
Thought of all thoughts maybe meaningless or irrelevant, but in a way, by definition, it is a thought. 
Russell’s paradox might be best understood within a dynamical perspective when realizing that any 
thought’s assumed validity or meaning is always, humanly speaking, provisional, always offered to 
others for further confirmation, attestation, falsification, etc. Some thoughts, and among them some 
scientific theories, may prove a posteriori continuously valid. However, even in that case, such 
thoughts or theories may always be further tested, expanded, inserted within wider theoretical 
frames or linked together with other thoughts. Therefore, is the concept of ‘pure eigenstate of the 
universe’ acceptable in spite of its absolute, rather totalising character? Adopting this concept 
would amount to end our efforts directed at understanding the coherence between matter and 
language by concluding that the question is pointless, which at least temporarily seems hardly 
convincing. On the other hand, is epistemology itself epistemologically legitimate in discarding an 
experimentally satisfying physical theory? The wit of yet another ancient Chinese thinker, Zhuangzi, 
in the famous tale ‘Three in the morning, four in the evening’ [5] illustrates the sometimes limited 
scope of human language and, therefore, of epistemology if considered alone. In the end, from the 
epistemological point of view, it seems that the idea of ‘pure eigenstates’ of the whole universe, 
although quite disturbing, cannot be fully discarded a priori. 
On the thermodynamic level, as has already been mentioned above, we see no clear reason to 
refuse the notion of ‘pure eigenstates’ of the universe. However, this opinion has only a temporary 
value, since quantum dynamics do not presently account for all physical phenomena in a unified 
way. Whether, for instance, any hypothetical future unification of gravity and quantum mechanics 
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within a single theoretical frame will leave more space for chaotic randomness than quantum 
statistics alone presently provide is difficult to guess.  
On the quantum dynamical level, the notion of ‘pure eigenstates’ of the universe becomes 
irrelevant when ‘quantum collapse’ events are allowed for. The phenomenon of quantum collapse 
remains physically poorly understood. An argument in favour of the natural occurrence of ‘quantum 
collapse’ events in nature lies in the fact that in a Young’s slits experiments performed on particles 
detected one by one, quantum collapse never produces itself before an individual particle reaches 
the screen since otherwise no interference would be observed. If the conscience of an observer 
was responsible for quantum collapse, why should such conscience be unable to produce the 
collapse before particles reach the screen? Maybe, in fact, quantum collapse events are so 
common in nature that, for instance, all solar photons arriving on the earth experience a kind of 
‘quantum collapse’ at their arrival. So far, however, nobody seems to know for sure if or with what 
kind of frequency quantum collapse events do happen in the universe. From the philosophical point 
of view, the tentatively ontologically indeterminist nature of ‘quantum collapse’ may have huge 
consequences. If ‘quantum collapse’ events really happen, present events may be considered to 
enjoy a certain degree of autonomy from the past of our universe. Such autonomy might provide a 
physical basis for the philosophical concepts of novelty and contingency. It may even help one to 
build up the concept of a subject (valid, at this level, for robots as well), which at the most basic level 
could be defined as the legitimate historical reference of an action. At a slightly more advanced 
level, subjects could even prove themselves capable to ‘play dice with the universe’. Absence of 
ontological determinism and even concrete free will are not yet synonymous with meaningful 
freedom, however, since freedom, ontologically, might ideally require a certain degree of freedom 
from the self, which physically appears at first sight quite paradoxical. Further philosophical 
speculations remain outside the object of this study. From the point of view of physics, let us simply 
note that quantum collapse, which constitutes the only serious concept presently capable to 
challenge the relevance of the notion of ‘pure eigenstates’ of the universe, remains highly 
speculative in nature. What is more, nobody seems to know whether, or to what extent, quantum 
collapse events can influence the thermodynamics of the universe, as Von Neumann [6] early 
suggested they might do.  
 
 
As a conclusion, we may simply note that the two examples provided above to illustrate how an 
operator may extract energy from some systems by varying the relaxation rate of thermal 
fluctuations acting on other fluctuations may pave the way for a completely new field of study and 
experiments. Meanwhile, entropy remains an authentic marker of the quantity of statistical disorder 
of macroscopic systems at any time. At best, only ‘new’ order may be introduced in a system, but 
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lost information is lost anyway. Thermal irreversibility still exists, while ‘novelty’ may also be hoped 
for.  
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